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Abstract
This article evaluates the impact of private allegations of malpractice against cardiac
surgeons on their patients’ outcomes and characteristics. While tort law may impact
observable physician costs, malpractice allegations also impose hidden costs that could
also affect physician behavior. We employ a large and multi-year panel dataset and
patient-level analysis to ascertain whether malpractice allegations influence a surgeon’s
practicing behavior. Using a generalized difference-in-difference model that controls for
unobserved patient heterogeneity, clustering of patients within surgeon offices,
contemporaneous expected risk, and other patient variables, we measure whether an
allegation of malpractices affects a physician’s service intensity and use of healthcare
resources. Our results find no evidence that physician behavior was sensitive to
allegations, findings of or settlements of malpractice claims. This is consistent with either
low levels of defensive medicine in this specialty or pervasive and persistent practices—
including defensive medicine—that are not significantly impacted by actual claims filed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law reform that limits recoverable damages is predicated on the theory that
reducing the costliness of negligence ought to reduce the practice of defensive medicine
and reduce healthcare delivery costs. Yet while recent tort law reforms appear to have
had a strong impact on reducing malpractice insurance premia, it has had little impact
reducing the practice of defensive medicine. To reconcile these findings, Danzon (2000)
suggested that the hidden costs of malpractice, such as psychic costs and loss of time
defending malpractice allegations, are the primary drivers of defensive medicine, whereas
tort reform only reduced observable costs.
If the Danzon hypothesis is true, then the introduction of hidden costs would
increase defensive medicine and change physician behavior even before observable
public, monetary and reputational costs occur following the adjudication or settling of
claims. We empirically test the impact of such private allegations of physician
malpractice on the services the accused physicians deliver to patients and the consequent
outcomes those patients exhibit.

II. HIDDEN AND OBSERVABLE COSTS IN MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
A. Tort Law and Defensive Medicine
Although tort law, in theory, should incent the provision of the appropriate
standard of healthcare, many healthcare professionals and policymakers believe that the
tort system instead induces the over-provision of care. Specifically, recent scholarship
has uncovered strong empirical evidence that the over-provision of care at the intensive
margin and under-provision at the extensive margin may be unintended and costly
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consequences of tort law (Shavell, 1984; Kessler & McClellan, 1996, 1997; Morrisey et
al., 2008).
Such ‘defensive medicine’, on the part of rational providers can be explained by
uncertainty in the process of assigning costs to individual providers (Morrisey et al.,
2008). Anecdotal and empirical evidence exists that the medical negligence system
operates poorly (Cranberg et al. 2007), contributing to such uncertainty (although many
find that malpractice judgments accurately reflect malpractice (Studdert et al. 2006)). The
tort system may also impose costs that are above those associated with compensation,
including reputational costs and the costs of defending suits. Defensive medicine then
reduces the risk of future litigation events, a plaintiff’s likelihood of success, and the
defendant’s costs of litigation.
Concern over costly ‘defensive medicine’ has led many legislatures to pass ‘tort
reform’ laws that, among other things, limit the damages that can be awarded to tort
victims (Avraham, 2007). Reducing the costliness of negligence ought to thus reduce the
practice of defensive medicine and reduce healthcare delivery costs (Hyman, 2007;
Dranove & Gron, 2005; Mello et al., 2004). A separate objective of tort reform is to
reduce the average premia of malpractice insurance as a direct consequence of lower total
awarded damages (Black, Hyman et al., 2008). Anecdotally, sufficiently high rates of
malpractice insurance may drive physicians out of delivery markets, although empirical
evidence suggests this is a low risk (Yang et al 2008; Black, Hyman et al., 2008).
Yet efforts at tort law reform appear to have had small impacts on the practice of
defensive medicine (Studdert et al, 2004; CBO, 2004; Bobvjerg & Tancredi, 2005;
Hellinger & Encinosa, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007; Sloan & Schadle, 2009; Waters, 2007),
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while having strong impacts on the level of malpractice insurance premia (Kessler &
McClellan, 1997; Morrisey et al., 2008; Sloan, 2003; Cline & Pepine 2004).
These findings need to be reconciled. One explanation is that physician practice
patterns are persistent over time and insensitive to the threat of tort suits,, although
physician behavior has been shown to be responsive to therapeutic and incentive norms
(Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007), militating against an explanation of simple persistence of
practice.

Indeed, tort law reform with a potentially negative financial impact on

physicians, such as the reform of the joint and several liability rules, has indeed been
shown to have the expected effect of more cautionary physician behavior (Currie &
Macleod 2008). A related but more limited possibility is that defensive medicine is
pervasive and is supported by both therapeutic norms and by financial incentives, even
when the costs of negligence are reduced. And yet another potential explanation is that
the link between actual malpractice and an ultimate adverse judgment is sufficiently
tenuous (Adams & Garber 2007), such that rational physicians do not change behavior in
response to fears of future claims.

B. The Hidden Costs of Malpractice Claims
In this paper, we investigate an alternative explanation, suggested by Danzon
(2000) and raised again by Morrisey et al. (2008), that the threat of hidden—rather than
observable—costs of malpractice are the primary drivers of defensive medicine.
This explanation supposes that a meaningful proportion of the overall expected
cost of malpractice claims—that is, the costs to physicians that physicians thereby seek to
avoid—is associated with the mere event of a tort action being commenced. Such costs
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may, for example, include the non-financial costs of stress and the cognitive load of
defending litigation (Morrissey et al, 2008), the lost time and associated direct financial
costs from lost patient revenue or failure to develop a practice, and other reputational
costs. Additionally, these hidden costs could be heightened by common errors that take
place in unsuccessful settlement negotiations (Kiser et al 2008). They may also include
lost time and the associated direct financial costs from lost patient revenue or failure to
develop a practice. Crucially, such costs are neither insurable nor recoverable, are borne
entirely by the defendant provider and commence immediately on private receipt of an
allegation of malpractice.
Private and uninsurable costs of this nature could simultaneously explain both the
reduction in malpractice premia and the small or insignificant impact on defensive
medicine. Reform tends most directly to reduce a defendant’s insurance costs conditional
on litigation than to reduce the likelihood of litigation. By construction, capped awards or
collateral source offsets reduce payouts conditional on litigation (Black, Hyman et al.,
2008).

These reforms, however, do nothing to change the short-run hidden costs,

including the stress and time lost time from dealing with a filed claim.

If these

unobservable costs affect physician behavior, then we are more likely to detect
behavioral changes following the initiation of malpractice claims (which are
communicated privately) rather than following more public events, such as the filing of a
lawsuit or the announcement of a settlement or judgment.

C. Prior Research

5

We argue that the ‘private’ costs of malpractice are separate from and in addition
to any later ‘public’ costs occasioned by reputational damage. Dranove et al (2008)
investigate such public costs and find that publicly knowable events such as suit filings
are associated with a less attractive payor mix in the twelve months subsequent to an
obstetrician being sued. Like us, Dranove et al (2008) assume that claimed malpractice
has adverse effects on a physician, regardless of final disposition of the claim. We also
consider the filing of a lawsuit per se as a negative reputational signal even though in our
setting two of every five final decisions are not for the plaintiff and did not involve
payment or court proceedings.
Unlike us, Dranove et al’s model requires well-informed consumers and/or
insurers observing external data and then rapidly changing preferences over providers or
changing selective contracts with providers. Instead, we assume that a reported allegation
of injury is immediately observable to the physician and occurs long before the public
signal, if any, of a suit. For example, in our data, there is almost 1 year between the
private reporting of an alleged claim and the public filing of a lawsuit. In more than 1 in 5
claims in our sample, no lawsuit is filed and claims instead are dropped, settled or
arbitrated. We assume that psychic costs occur following a claim even when no lawsuit is
filed, but we note that this area is understudied, and the only empirical evidence through
physician surveys have not supported this (Glassman et al, 1996).
In this article, we seek to show that such private costs exist and have meaningful,
exogenous effects on physician behavior. Our study uses patient-level data, which
controls for patient heterogeneity, and examines whether malpractice claims induce
Florida cardiac surgeons to increase the intensity and costs of health services to
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subsequent patients. Gimm (2010) employed a similar physician-level model with Florida
data and concluded that privately communicated claims did not affect C-section rates or
the caseloads of Florida obstetricians. But because of the limited spectrum of patients,
that study was not ideal to control for patient heterogeneity, the failure to reject the null
hypothesis of no impact may be due to omitted variables.

Since prior work has shown

that there are complex relationships between typical malpractice risk in a geography and
patient-level outcomes (Dhankhar et al 2007), patient-level data with patients exhibiting a
diverse spectrum of conditions offers a better opportunity to test for hidden costs.
We investigate these hypotheses using a detailed administrative discharge dataset
comprising more than 220,000 cardiac surgeries performed by 314 operating cardiac
surgeons in Florida between 1998 and 2006. Of these surgeons, 113 had patients who
initiated malpractice claims in 1998-2006 that were subsequently reported to the Office
of Insurance Regulation in Florida. For each patient we have data on pre-existing risk
factors, payor status, and in-hospital outcomes. We link surgeon identifiers to publicly
available data on closed allegations of injury submitted by malpractice insurers to the
Florida Office of Insurance Reform between 1994 and 2009.
Malpractice claims data from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation are ideal
to test this hypothesis because for each settled malpractice claim we have dates for each
of the key events: the alleged occurrence, the report of alleged malpractice, the suit filing,
and the disposition of the case. We also have data on key outcomes, including the
dispute resolution process, decision, and financial awards if any. We construct measures
of lagged claim events (alleged occurrences, reports, filings and final dispositions) for
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each surgeon over time and relate this to his or her contemporaneous patient-level
charges, outcomes, payor status and ex ante patient risk.
Our main analytical approach uses a general difference-in-difference design to
test the effects of allegations on patient-level charges and outcomes. We expect that more
charges will be incurred without changes in outcomes in patients seen following the
private report of an alleged injury. We do not expect that the filing of a lawsuit will lead
to any changes, since we hypothesize that these have already been triggered by the earlier
private report of injury. Conversely, we expect the final disposition of an allegation to be
followed by lower incurred charges. Crucially, we expect that a decision in favor or
against the defendant at final disposition should make no difference to the measures of
provider behavior we use, since any judgments are insurable costs.

III. METHODOLOGY
A. Patient Level Data
Our patient-level data is from the Agency for Health Care Administration in
Florida, and represents all 229,153 records discharges for CABG performed in stateregulated hospitals in the 36 quarters in 1998-2006. We excluded patient records where
the hospital had admitted less than 5 records over the panel (20), where the patient’s age
was less than 18 years (22), where the admitting hospital was unable to be matched to
any known facility characteristics data (33), and where the operating medical practitioner
was only observed one quarter (1,377). Almost all of these were singleton observations
and likely data entry errors.
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A further 1,661 patient records were discarded where the average number of cases
per period per was 1 or less. A further 4,713 observations were dropped where publicly
available information from the Florida department of health confirms that the operating
medical license was a non-surgeon (e.g. an internist, or a cardiologist, or a family
physician). These may be due either to erroneous data entry or assistants wrongly entered
as the operating surgeon, or cases that had both major medical and surgical treatment.
Finally, records were merged for 6 clearly identified (name, history) surgeons
who held both a “Medical Faculty Certificate” and a “Medical Physician” license over
the panel, treating patients under both licenses. This exclusion and validation reduced our
data to 221,327 admission and 397 operating surgeons.

B. Surgeon and Claim Level Data
Our surgeon-level claims data are the reports of alleged error, omission or
negligence by insured doctors held by the Office of Insurance Regulation in the Florida
Department of Financial Services. In our data, insured doctors include allopathic
physicians (i.e. MDs) as well as osteopathic and podiatric physicians. None of the 6
osteopathic medical degree holding cardiac surgeons (with 1901.x license identifiers) or
the one podiatric medical degree holding cardiac surgeon (2101.x) or any surgeons
practicing exclusively under a medical faculty licensure (1508.x) had any closed claims
recorded in this data. Most of these claims led to the filing of a lawsuit, most of which did
not go to court (see Table 1).

<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
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We consider only alleged injuries categorized as “significant harm” or worse.
Specifically, these were death of the patient, grave harm (quadriplegia, severe brain
damage, lifelong care or fatal prognosis), major harm (paraplegia, blindness, loss of two
limbs, brain damage.) and significant harm (deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of
one kidney or lung). The OIR data contained additional closed claims representing
substantially less severe injuries. We chose not to include these to preserve homogeneity
in the claim unit of analysis and since we expect the more severe claims to have the most
impact on behavior. See https://apps.fldfs.com/PLCR/Search/MPLClaim.aspx for more
details.
The malpractice claims data includes four sequential categories of events related
to malpractice claims (Figure 1). These comprise of (i) alleged injury occurrence
detailing date, place, nature and allegedly responsible (retrospectively communicated at
the time of the report), (ii) report of claim to a surgeon’s malpractice insurer and to the
surgeon, (iii) filing of suit, if any, and (iv) final disposition of the claim.

<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >>

The data affords an opportunity to examine behavioral changes following the
reporting of a claim while controlling for any subsequent suit or award. We thus are able
to test the independent effect of the reporting of such a claim and its associated costs,
such as the stress of resolving an ongoing action, costs (both dollars and time spent)
disputing the claim, and other psychic and monetary costs. These costs are thus separated
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from the more conventional direct (i.e. damages) and indirect (i.e. reputational harm)
costs of malpractice litigation. These more conventional direct and indirect costs were
investigated by Dranove et al. (2008) who find that publicly knowable events such as suit
filings are associated with a less attractive payor mix in the twelve months subsequent to
an obstetrician being sued.
Of the 397 cardiac surgeons in our panel, 250 have no closed claims recorded at
all in the fifteen-year interval from 1994 to 2009 spanned by our malpractice insurance
surgeon-level data. A further eleven surgeons have all their closed claims comprise
events which all happened outside the nine year interval from 1998 to 2006 spanned by
our patient-level admission data. We restrict our analysis to procedures occurring no later
than 2006 because many claims require as many as three years to resolve and claims
enter the Florida database only once closed, thus malpractice claims reported in 20072009 are unlikely to be in the data.
As a preliminary matter, we confirm a strong positive association between a
physician’s number of closed claims and his/her total volume (Pearson correlation 0.273,
p<.001). We excluded 83 surgeons on the basis of implausibly low annual volume (< 10
cases) and low participation (e.g. one quarter a year for three years). These surgeons are
unrepresentative of the typical surgeon. They are likely to have major non-Floridian
practices (e.g. in Georgia or Alabama, or if practicing at Mayo’s Florida campus they
may practice further afield at the main Rochester, MN campus), or practicing
concurrently in non-state-regulated hospitals (e.g. the Veterans’ Administration
hospitals). Our data use agreement forbids us from contacting the surgeons to explore
this. Compared to the included surgeons, the excluded surgeons had lower average settled
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claims (0.45 versus 0.67; two-tailed t test p = .076) and lower average number of events
observed in the panel (0.82 versus 1.26; two-tailed t test p = .038). These small
differences were not consistent with an alternative explanation that the excluded surgeons
had exited the panel as a result of alleged injuries sustained by their patients.
The effect of these exclusion criteria was to reduce total surgeons to 314, and the
number of patient records to 220,843. The total number of closed claims observed is 211
claims, and 113 surgeons had at least one closed claim from which 89 surgeons
experienced at least one suit.
We reconstruct a summary dataset of malpractice claims using the
surgeon*quarter as unit of observation with the twelve month lagged total of each of the
four malpractice events. This lagging further reduced final regression observations to
185,849 patient records and 296 surgeons. This summary data, reported in Table 2,
includes alleged occurrences, of private reports, of filed suits, and of final dispositions
(which were distinguished by decisions for the plaintiff or for the defendant). We observe
but don’t analyze the size of monetary damages.

<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>

We merged these data with the patient-level data: for each patient admission we
are able to relate patient-level dependent variables to lagged surgeon-level flows of
malpractice ‘events’. We present surgeon-level summary histograms of lagged event
flows in Table 3 and Figures 2a-e, respectively.
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<< INSERT FIGURES 2a-e ABOUT HERE >>

C. Variables
We study the incidence of the following binary events: prolonged mechanical
ventilation, in-hospital mortality, discharge destination not home. The latter includes all
live discharges who have some degree of home healthcare, or who were discharged to
sub-acute and convalescent hospitals or nursing homes. Additionally we examined the
following continuous events, using the natural logarithmic transformation of length of
stay, operating room, non-operating room and total charges.1

These are assorted

measures of treatment intensity and serve as our dependent variables.

1

We did not have data on hospital reimbursements for claimed services, but the

discharge data did contain itemized charges representing the product of list prices per
service and a range of itemized services. As long as we control for unobserved
heterogeneity among individual hospitals in setting such charges, and for secular trends
in the list prices, these charges likely amount to an accurate measure of hospital-site
service intensity.

We do not deflate these charges for several reasons. Our use of

calendar fixed effects should control for statewide secular trends, and our use of hospital
fixed effects mitigates some time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in setting charges at
the individual hospital level. Another reason not to deflate these charges is that they do
not represent actual cash flows, but rather list prices. It is not immediately clear whether
inflation in list prices tracks the producer price indexes that could be used for deflation
purposes.
13

We also computed a measure of ex ante risk by fitting a parsimonious logit
regression on the binary outcome of in-hospital death controlling for the independent
variables below (pseudo R2 of 0.18, C-statistic of 0.83). The high area under the receiver
operating curve suggests some over-fitting: that is, some of the covariates are possibly ex
interim correlates of in-hospital mortality, as opposed to ex ante predictors. The predicted
values from this regression for all patients identify changes in the risk profile of a
surgeon’s practice.
We utilize a large number of control variables from the administrative discharge
data. Patient demographics (age, gender, non-white race), acuity (emergency
presentation, transfer from another hospital), and payor status (government payor) help
control for patient morbidity. We also link patient county of residence information to
2005 Census Bureau data on county proportions over 65 years, below poverty level and
with bachelor degree, as well as median family income. There were also a large number
of comorbidities (plausibly present at time of admission, although this is not known for
sure).
To these focal variables we add one more control: the lagged number of cases the
surgeon performed in the prior twelve months before the current quarter of the patient’s
admission. We do this to ensure that experience or scale economies do not confound the
effect of malpractice allegations.

D. Statistical Model
We specified a reduced form model of the impact of lagged malpractice
allegations on aspects of a surgeon’s current patient admission. Our patient-level
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regressions are linear probability models for binary dependent and ordinary least squares
for continuous dependent variables. In unreported analyses we also specified probit
models for the binary dependent variables, but these did not qualitatively change the
reported results.
For patients indexed by i, treated by operating surgeon s, in hospital h admitted in
quarterly period q of year t we estimate the following using ordinary least squares with
robust standard errors clustered by operating surgeon:

yishq =  + Xi + Xs + h + t + ihq

The to-be-estimated vector  estimates the marginal effects of the focal variables of
interest Xs, a (5x1) vector with generic element 4j=1(Lq-j), where L represents a quarterly
flow of cases, alleged occurrences of malpractice, reports of alleged malpractice,
malpractice suits filed and closed claims, respectively.
Independent variables comprise calendar year fixed effects t, 74 hospital fixed
effects h as well as a vector of patient controls Xi (age, gender, non-white race,
emergency presentation, transfer from another hospital, government payor, a large
number of comorbidities and several county-level ecological variables from 2005 Census
Bureau data on county proportions over 65 years, below poverty level and with bachelor
degree, as well as median family income.).
Table 3 summarizes patient-weighted means of dependent and focal independent
variables. Covariates and summary statistics are shown in Table 4, and a linear regression
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of these on in-hospital mortality showed no substantial multicollinearity (maximum VIF
of 4.4, mean VIF of 1.4).

<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>

<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >>

Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional variation only. If patients
select surgeons on the basis of publicly observable information on L, then an omitted
variable bias may impact our estimates of. Since our interest is in privately-known
surgeon-level events, this source of potential bias may not be too serious.
However, if a surgeon chooses to treat patients with lower risk (and hence with
exogenously lower charges and better outcomes) after some event in L, then clearly 
could be biased towards zero. We computed a measure of ex ante risk by fitting a
parsimonious logit regression on the binary outcome of in-hospital death. We then
checked for changes in patient risk, treating the ex-ante patient expected risk as a
dependent variable analogously to the other dependent variables, but found no evidence
of such changes (see Table 5, first column). Ideally, we should like to instrument for the
events in L, but we were not able to conceive of a suitably exogenous proxy for
individual surgeon allegation susceptibility.
We used Stata v10 for all data management and statistical analyses. We
considered p values of 0.05 significant and report only two-sided tests. We report
estimated parameters both with robust standard errors and with robust standard errors
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clustered by operating surgeon. We did not correct for multiple comparisons (Rothman
1990). Our institution’s Health System Institutional Review Board approved this study.

IV. RESULTS
In Table 5 we report the marginal impact of a surgeon’s additional claim event in
the twelve months prior to the admission of the current patient. Columns represent
separate regressions on separate dependent variables. We suppress reporting of the
control covariates. Our measure of lagged cases (representing either or both of experience
or scale economies) was highly significant and associated with a reduction in length of
stay and hospital charges, and a reduction in the probability of prolonged mechanical
ventilation, death in-hospital and discharge elsewhere than directly home.

<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>

However, our focal variables of lagged malpractice events – whether private
occurrences or reports, or public filings and dispositions – were not consistently
associated with any of the patient outcomes in Table 5. Given the number of
comparisons, the four coefficients estimated at p-values just below and just above .05 are
likely due to chance alone. In particular, we find no evidence that the private occurrences
and private reports of alleged malpractice impact patient charges.
The outcomes we investigate in Table 5 span both the mortality (averaging 3.8%)
and serious morbidity in cardiac surgery. It is well-known that as many as 3% of CABG
patients suffer strokes, around 2% experience kidney damage severe enough to require
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dialysis, and a further 3% survive a prolonged chest wall wound site infection (Eagle et
al, 2004). In the panel, the incidence of these unobserved major morbidity events may
lead to longer length of stay (average 10.2 days), discharge elsewhere than home
(20.8%), and prolonged mechanical ventilation greater than 96 hours (2.9%). We found
no evidence that any patient outcomes were affected by any of the sequence of events
from alleged occurrence through to final disposition.
This is fails to support the putative mechanism of private stress and distractions
causing defensive medicine (Danzon 2000). On the other hand, publicly observable
signals of lawsuits also have no apparent impact on treatment service intensity either,
unlike in Dranove et al’s (2008) setting.

<< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >>

In Table 6, we examine whether the payor status of the current patient was
associated with lagged malpractice allegations on the part of the patient’s surgeon. After
the private alleged occurrence of malpractice in the prior 12 months before the quarter of
the patient’s admission, a patient was slightly less likely to have private indemnity
insurance (p <.05). After closed claims decided or settled against the surgeon, there was
a slight reduction (increase) in the probability that a patient had PPO (HMO) insurance,
both p <.05.
Finally, following prior scholarship (Dranove et al., 2008; Gimm, 2010), we also
constructed physician-level models in addition to the patient-level models above. Prior
work used linear regression in surgeon-level aggregate analyses to relate public
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malpractice suit filings to subsequent changes in surgeon caseload and payor
composition, and has also examined the correlation between malpractice events within a
physician over time (Bovbjerg & Petronis 1994).
In our setting there was substantial positive serial correlation in the physicianlevel aggregates series and significant unobserved surgeon-level effects. Controlling for
these with an assumed first-order auto-regressive function error structure and a surgeon
fixed effects panel model, we found no significant relationship between the lagged flows
of claim events and subsequent surgeon caseload, payor mix or ex ante patient risk.
Finally, we also found no differences between analyses restricted to patients in the
1998-2003 period or to the 2004-2006 period. The latter period marked the institution of
damages caps and other tort law reforms that passed Florida’s state house in the final
months of 2003. This may be due to the long tail of existing claims not bound by the new
law; future re-analysis may show that claims first reported after the law change did have
an impact on behavior. In other unreported analysis, we repeated all the charges analyses
using Winsorized charges to remove the influence of far outliers, but results remained
qualitatively unchanged.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our study failed to show that cardiac surgeons, practicing in Florida over a recent
nine-year period, increased the intensity of or otherwise changed attributes of the
healthcare services they rendered in response to a recent malpractice claim, suit, or
settlement.
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Our analytical strategy attempted to identify such practices off of substantial
variation across surgeons in the flow of claim events, inferring surgeon behavior off of
changes in patient-level outcomes, risk, and payor status or hospital charges. We found
very modest evidence of decreases in patient charges following final dispositions in favor
of a surgeon, and unfavorable changes in patient payor mix following dispositions
against a surgeon. There were no statistically persuasive changes in patient costs or
outcomes associated with private reports.
These findings have a number of possible explanations. First, it is possible that
the physicians do respond to the initiation of malpractice claims but exhibit a response
that cannot easily be discerned even in such a large and long panel dataset. That is, the
‘impulse response function’ associated with an allegation of malpractice may be too
muted. This could occur, for example, if the ‘signal’ of an allegation is too weak or too
diffuse, or if provider patterns of practice resist rapid change.
Relatedly, surgeons might anticipate the threat of a tort action and thus adjust
their levels of care—and their provision of defensive medicine—before any malpractice
claim is filed.

Thus, a behavioral change cannot be detected because physicians—

regardless of whether an action is filed against them—operate within the shadow of the
tort system.
Alternatively, malpractice claims might be sufficiently pervasive—or the ‘signal’
of an allegation in its identification of a particular surgeon might be too weak or
imprecise—that many physicians in our sample believe that their conduct cannot affect
the likelihood of a subsequent tort action. We note that in the three major east coast
counties in Florida, 94% of cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons have been sued, with ‘an
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average of 2.1 past lawsuits each…, an average of 1.5 lawsuits pending and an average
total of 3.6 lawsuits each so far in their career’ (Palmisano 2004, p10).
Under this perspective, the uncertainty and imprecision of malpractice law—i.e.
its inability to target only physicians who act negligently—impose significant social
costs, including but not limited to pervasive defensive medicine. Similarly, the problem
of determining negligence when multiple parties (e.g. an independent physician and a
hospital) both dilutes the incremental legal liability attributable to the surgeon and creates
a cloud of potential liability within collaborative conduct.
Such collaboration in medical care—and in producing medical errors—is
common. In an analysis of patient claims alleging general surgical errors, 62% of errors
involved more than one physician (Rogers et al., 2006). Collaborative conduct also
invites invoking flexible doctrines such as ‘apparent authority’ liability and vicarious
liability, which further obscure the allocation of liability. Consequently, surgeons might
seek to decrease their expected liability by coordinating care with other legal entities
even though such coordination often leads to lower quality of care.
The specialist surgical literature documents adverse patient and hospital outcomes
associated with increased hand-offs and blurring of responsibility in multi-specialty
teams (Williams et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2006). Greenberg et al. (2007) identify serious
communications breakdowns as typically involving verbal communication between a
dyad comprising the senior surgical staff and another caregiver. Such related concerns
over the fragmentation of medical care (Elhauge, 2010) and the imprecision of
malpractice law have convinced many to seek enterprise liability tort reforms
(Havighurst, 2000; Arlen & McLeod, 2003).
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Finally, it is also possible that provider practice patterns exhibit such persistence
that even correctly perceived informative signals are not able to drive change rapidly
enough. The extensive literature on small-area variations in physician behavior is
consistent with highly persistent idiosyncratic physician behavior. A long stream of work
has looked at how practice patterns persist, and how peers, guidelines and other source of
information may change these (Escarce, 1997, Valente & Davis, 1999; Majumdar et al,
2002; 2004). Research on peer effects and key opinion leadership in healthcare delivery
also suggests the difficulty of changing the practices of individual physicians (Berwick,
2003; Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007). Our strategy explicitly assumes that events in the prior
twelve months are able to affect change, but this may simply be too short a period to
observe changes in physician conduct. This might suggest that the malpractice system
does a poor job of deterring negligent conduct, even if it still might play an insurance role
by providing compensation to injured parties.
Our study has several important limitations. We narrowly focus on one treatment
within one specialty within one state. Yet this is a disease area where past research has
found some evidence for defensive medicine identified off of reform (Kessler &
McClellan, 1996; 1997) and a state where recent research (Dranove et al, 2008) has
demonstrated some behavioral changes among obstetricians following suits.
On the other hand, our focus on one state blurs well-known small area variations
(Wennberg & Cooper 1999; Huesch 2010) in patient outcomes and similar variations in
claiming frequencies related to family income (Hart & Peters 2008) or the level of
expected damages related to county poverty rates or income inequality (Kohler-Hausman
2011). While we controlled for hospital-level fixed effects that are likely closely
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correlated with such small area-level effects, the effect of other related but omitted
variables is not known.
Our data on claims is a right-censored sample. Given the mean four year period
between alleged injury and final disposition, there are likely to be some open claims
related to our panel not captured in the OIR data through November 2009. Additional
ascertainment bias may exist if surgeons who ‘go bare’ (i.e. do not carry malpractice
insurance and accept the risk of bankruptcy) give rise to unobserved claims. A related
limitation of our data is that we do not observe events such as early offers of settlement
occurring between initial notification of a claim and subsequent events. There is some
conflicting empirical evidence whether such early offers may reduce defense costs (Black
et al 2009). Our data was unable to capture this claim-level granularity.
The Florida Medical Association additionally cautions that “the settlement of
malpractice claims occurs for a variety of reasons, which do not necessarily reflect
negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the individual provider or
institution. Payment of a claim should not be a presumption that malpractice has
occurred. Physicians often have little control over whether the insurance company pays
an award.” (Florida Medical Association)
While our data on hospital charges seem a noisy but unbiased proxy for treatment
intensity, they are clearly upper bounds on actual payments. Thus we do not actually
know the estimated changes in per patient payments associated with the estimated
changes in per patient charges. A related major limitation is that we do not observe
physician charges. Our outcomes are in-hospital only, and our estimates of no changes in
patient outcomes might change if we looked at 30 day mortality or 1 year survival.
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We fail to reject the hypothesis that hidden costs, such as those imposed by the
reporting of a malpractice claim, do not induce physicians to prescribe additionally
defensive and costly care. We additionally fail to detect whether observable costs, such
as the filing of a malpractice lawsuit or the release of a malpractice settlement, similarly
affect physician behavior. We interpret the results from our null study and those in other
recent articles (Sloan & Schadle, 2009; Morrisey et al., 2008; Gimm, 2010) to suggest
that malpractice claims have little effect on physician behavior and healthcare costs.
Perhaps this is because physicians operate within the shadowed threat of
malpractice claims before any claims or suits are filed against them, such that they cannot
provide additionally defensive medicine following a claim, suit, or judgment. This would
suggest that malpractice claims might not exacerbate defensive medicine because such
defensive over-provision of care is already widespread. Alternatively, physicians might
be unresponsive to malpractice actions because physician behavior is inflexible and
unresponsive to the threat of liability. This would suggest that defensive medicine might
not be as pervasive as tort reformers might think, and that the tort system is a poor device
to incent physicians and improve healthcare quality. Both of these conclusions are
observationally equivalent.
Well-intentioned tort law reform may thus reduce the costs of negligence and thus
reduce malpractice insurance premiums, but there is little evidence to suggest it affects
outcomes in the healthcare delivery and financing markets. Changing practice patterns
through other financial incentives, information (e.g. on cost, effectiveness, evidence
bases), peer review, and judicious implementation of technology-enabled quality
controls, audits and decision support may be promising policy alternatives.
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Table 1: Claim-level Events

Counts
Alleged occurences

211

Reported claims, of which:

211

Led to filed suit, of which:
Dropped/no court proceedings recorded
Settled for defendant
Settled for plaintiff
Did not proceed
Arbitrated
Found for defendant
Found for plaintiff
Settled
Settled for defendant
Settled for plaintiff
Went to court
Found for defendant
Found for plaintiff
Dropped/did not proceed

165

Did not lead to suit filed, of which:
Arbitrated
Found for defendant
Found for plaintiff
Dropped/no court proceedings recorded
Settled for defendant
Settled for plaintiff
Did not proceed
Settled
Settled for defendant
Settled for plaintiff

46

Closed claims

21
2
0
19
1
1
0
113
14
99
30
14
2
14

2
0
2
14
0
0
14
30
7
23
211

Note: Claim-level counts for analysis dataset.

32

Figure 1: Timeline and Typical Sequence of Events Analyzed

Alleged occurrence of
injury due to malpractice
by physician

14 months

Private report alleging
injury communicated
to physician

Public filing of
malpractice
lawsuit against
physician

10 months

Claim
withdrawn,
settled, decided in
court or in
arbitration

25 months

Note: This sequence of events is only observed if a claim is made (some allegations are resolved through pre-emptive
settlements and are not recorded by the OIR database) and the claim was closed by November, 2009, when we accessed the
Closed Claims OIR database. Values in months indicate mean durations in our data.
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Table 2: Surgeon-level Focal Independent Variables

Mean
Surgeon's lagged CABG cases (#, prior 4 quarters)

95.2

Surgeon's lagged events (#, prior 4 quarters)
Alleged occurences
Reported claims
Filed suits
Closed claims (against surgeon)
Closed claims (for surgeon)

0.06
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.02

Std. Dev.
68.5
0.12
0.10
0.09
0.07
0.05

Min

Max
3

351.5

0
0
0
0
0

0.94
0.73
0.60
0.57
0.30

Note: Surgeon-level unweighted means for 296 surgeons in regressions.
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Figure 2a: Histogram of Surgeon-Level Lagged Claim Events, Alleged Incidents
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Figure 2b: Reported Claims
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Figure 2c: Filed Suits
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Figure 2d: Dispositions Against Surgeon
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Figure 2e: Dispositions In Favor of Surgeon
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Table 3: Patient-weighted Dependent and Focal Independent Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Ex ante variables (%)
Expected in-hospital mortality
Payor status: Medicare
PPO
HMO
MedicareMC
Indemnity
Medicaid
Medicaid HMO

3.9
50.4
12.6
12.0
11.8
4.2
2.1
0.8

6.6
50.0
33.2
32.5
32.2
20.1
14.2
9.0

Outcomes (%)
Prolonged mech. Ventilation
In-hospital mortality
Discharged not directly/alone home

3.0
3.8
21.3

16.9
19.1
40.9

Length of stay (days)

10.3

8.8

99,432
18,993
80,439

81,401
14,078
75,438

168.8

76.3

0.08
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.03

0.28
0.31
0.28
0.22
0.18

Hospital itemized charges ($)
Total
Operating room only
Non-operating room
Surgeon's lagged CABG cases (#, prior 4 quarters)
Surgeon's lagged events (#, prior 4 quarters)
Alleged occurences
Reported claims
Filed suits
Closed claims (against surgeon)
Closed claims (for surgeon)

Median (25-75 centiles)

8 (6 - 12)
77,816 (55,489 - 116,319)
14,661 (10,056 - 23,260)
61,130 (41,964 - 93,333)

Note: Patient-weighted means for 185,849 observations in regressions. Twelve months lagged
predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Control Covariates
Mean

Std. Dev.

Age (years)
67.5
10.7
Female
29.0
45.4
Non-white
9.4
29.1
Emergency
25.0
43.3
Transfer
42.4
49.4
Government payor
65.9
47.4
County - bachelor degree
24.8
5.4
Elderly
18.1
6.0
Below poverty level
12.4
2.7
Family income median ($)
42,904
4,647
Known coronary artery disease
95.0
21.8
Hypertension
54.9
49.8
Dysrhythmiae
38.6
48.7
Unstable angina
35.9
48.0
Diabetes mellitus
29.4
45.6
Acue myocardial infarction
25.9
43.8
Congestive heart failure
23.8
42.6
Chronic obstructive lung disease
20.0
40.0
Fluid disorder
14.4
35.1
Concurrent valve operation
13.7
34.4
Coagulopathy
10.7
31.0
Angina
10.6
30.8
Complications of hypertension
7.3
26.1
Conduction disorder
6.3
24.2
Ventricular tachycardia
4.9
21.6
Carditis
2.9
16.7
Pumonary artery heart disease
2.7
16.2
Aneurysms
2.4
15.3
Cerebrovascular disease
1.7
13.0
Chronic kidney disease
1.7
12.8
Liver disease
1.1
10.3
Transient ischemic attacks
0.4
6.2
2000
14.6
35.3
2001
14.1
34.8
2002
13.3
34.0
2003
11.9
32.4
2004
11.6
32.0
2005
10.8
31.0
2006
9.6
29.4
Note: Patient-weighted means (%, unless otherwise indicated) for 185,849
observations in regressions. Twelve months lagged predictors explains
reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
Excluded calendar year indicator: 1999. County ecological variables merged
in from 2005 Census Bureau data for Florida county of patient's residence,
set to mean where out of state or missing.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Impact of Lagged Surgeon Claim Events on Patient Risk, Hospital Charges and Outcomes

Expected inhospital
mortality

Log Length
of stay

Log OR
charges

Log NonOR charges

Ventilation
> 96 hours

Died inhospital

Discharge
not
directly
home

Patient controls

Included in all specifications

Calendar and facility fixed effects

"

Caseload, last 4 quarters

0.0000 ¶
(0.0000)

-0.0004 ***
(0.0001)

-0.0006 ***
(0.0001)

-0.0004 ***
(0.0001)

-0.0001 ***
(0.0000)

-0.0001 ***
(0.0000)

-0.0002 ***
(0.0000)

0.0002
(0.0003)

0.0044
(0.0061)

0.0092
(0.0185)

-0.0115
(0.0107)

0.0002
(0.0016)

0.0009
(0.0019)

-0.0051
(0.0046)

Reported claims

0.0001
(0.0003)

-0.0037
(0.0050)

0.0154
(0.0182)

0.0043
(0.0110)

-0.0013
(0.0016)

-0.0024
(0.0015)

-0.0037
(0.0065)

Filed suits

-0.0004
(0.0003)

-0.0008
(0.0083)

-0.0033
(0.0173)

-0.0037
(0.0093)

-0.0004
(0.0015)

0.0030 ¶
(0.0017)

-0.0016
(0.0050)

Closed claims (against surgeon)

0.0001
(0.0003)

0.0019
(0.0073)

0.0123
(0.0262)

0.0200 ¶
(0.0113)

0.0017
(0.0023)

0.0015
(0.0031)

-0.0056
(0.0068)

Closed claims (for surgeon)

-0.0002
(0.0005)

0.0087
(0.0097)

-0.0278
(0.0275)

-0.0289 *
(0.0136)

-0.0004
(0.0029)

0.0052 *
(0.0024)

-0.0005
(0.0075)

R2
Observations

76.5%
185,849

38.6%
185,625

71.5%
185,081

64.6%
185,849

8.1%
185,849

9.0%
185,849

24.8%
185,849

Lagged # events, last 4 quarters
Alleged incident malpractice

Note: Regressions on column dependent variables. Estimates and (below) robust standard errors clustered by operating cardiac surgeon. Estimated parameters significant
at (***) p<.001; (**) p<.01; (*) p<.05; and (¶) p<.10. Twelve patient demographic and ecological covariates, 22 comorbidity covariates, 8 calendar year fixed effects and 74
facility fixed effects included in all specifications. Twelve months lagged predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
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Table 6: Regression Results for Impact of Lagged Surgeon Claim Events on Focal Patient Payor Status

PPO

FFS

Medicare
MC

Medicare
FFS

Medicaid

-3.45E-06
(1.03E-05)

5.35E-05
(5.40E-05)

-3.10E-06
(6.33E-05)

-3.78E-05 *** -1.91E-05 **
(8.71E-06)
(6.36E-06)

HMO

Patient controls

Included in all specifications

Calendar and facility fixed effects

"

Caseload, last 4 quarters

Lagged # events, last 4 quarters
Alleged incident malpractice

4.76E-05 *
(1.88E-05)

1.43E-05
(2.32E-05)

Medicaid
HMO

-0.0030
(0.0025)

0.0076
(0.0050)

-0.0040 *
(0.0018)

0.0009
(0.0061)

0.0029
(0.0057)

-0.0023 ¶
(0.0013)

0.0015
(0.0021)

Reported claims

0.0011
(0.0036)

-0.0006
(0.0045)

-0.0005
(0.0020)

0.0048
(0.0057)

-0.0023
(0.0043)

0.0010
(0.0012)

-0.0027 *
(0.0012)

Filed suits

-0.0010
(0.0030)

0.0082 ¶
(0.0048)

-0.0016
(0.0021)

-0.0135 ¶
(0.0071)

0.0120 *
(0.0061)

0.0004
(0.0013)

-0.0007
(0.0012)

Closed claims (against surgeon)

-0.0085 *
(0.0041)

0.0171 *
(0.0074)

-0.0018
(0.0021)

-0.0083
(0.0072)

0.0012
(0.0070)

-0.0015
(0.0013)

-0.0016
(0.0016)

Closed claims (for surgeon)

-0.0042
(0.0080)

0.0042
(0.0083)

-0.0034
(0.0032)

-0.0018
(0.0118)

0.0065
(0.0099)

0.0011
(0.0017)

-0.0004
(0.0026)

14.8%

15.7%

7.3%

13.3%
185,849

36.1%

4.8%

3.2%

R2
Observations

Note: Linear probability model; regression on indicator for patient payor status. Estimates and (below) robust standard errors clustered by operating cardiac
surgeon. Estimated parameters significant at (***) p<.001; (**) p<.01; (*) p<.05; and (¶) p<.10. Twelve patient demographic and ecological covariates, 22 comorbidity
covariates, 8 year fixed effects and 74 facility fixed effects included. Note 'government payor' control omitted from all specifications. Twelve months lagged
predictors explains reduction in observations from total validated 220,843 admissions.
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